Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Briefs

Faculty

4-20-2015

Motion and Brief of Civil Procedure Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Alexander A. Reinert
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, areinert@yu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-briefs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Reinert, Alexander A., "Motion and Brief of Civil Procedure Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner" (2015). Briefs. 2.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-briefs/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Briefs by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information,
please contact christine.george@yu.edu.

14-969

d
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
GREG LANDERS,

Petitioner,

—v.—

QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOTION AND BRIEF OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

ALEXANDER A. REINERT
Counsel of Record
55 Fifth Avenue, Room 938
New York, New York 10003
(212) 790-0403
areinert@yu.edu
Attorney for Amici Curiae
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MOTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW
PROFESSORS FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
The Civil Procedure law professors identified
in Appendix A respectfully move for leave to file a
brief as amici curiae in support of the Petitioner.
Counsel of record for the parties received timely notice of amici curiae’s intent to file this brief as required by this Court’s Rule 37.2(a). Counsel for Petitioner consented in writing to the filing of the brief,
and their written consent has been lodged with the
Clerk’s office. Counsel for Respondents stated that
they did not consent to the filing of this brief, necessitating the filing of this motion.
Amici curiae have a deep and abiding interest
as scholars and teachers in the interpretation and
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and in particular the rules of pleading. Many amici
have participated before this Court in amicus briefs
regarding pleading and other issues relating to the
application and interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Arriving at a consistent and understandable pleading doctrine is therefore of great
interest to amici. Our continuing interest in the
clarity and simplicity of the rules of pleading has
been intensified by the growing confusion created by
the perceived changes in the requirements for stating a valid claim.
This confusion is highlighted by the present
case, and thus the case affords an excellent opportunity to provide guidance to the lower courts. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
complaint filed by Petitioner was inadequate be-
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cause it did not provide enough specific facts to meet
the pleading standard enunciated by this Court in
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Amici seek
leave to file this brief in support of the Petition because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is at odds with
this Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and because lower courts continue to be mired in conflict
and confusion over how to apply the decisions in
those cases. This case therefore provides this Court
with an opportunity to clarify the meaning of those
decisions and thereby reduce the uncertainty that
lingers over pleading doctrine.
Amici curiae therefore respectfully request
that they be granted leave to file the accompanying
brief in support of the Petitioner.
Respectfully submitted,
ALEXANDER A. REINERT
Counsel of Record
55 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003
(212) 790-0403
areinert@yu.edu
Attorney for Amici Curiae
MARCH 2015
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are scholars with expertise in
civil procedure who have an interest in the proper
interpretation of federal pleading standards following Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Amici file
this brief because the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case cannot be
squared with proper pleading doctrine and goes far
beyond any reasonable interpretation of this Court’s
holdings in Twombly and Iqbal. Certiorari is warranted to correct the Ninth Circuit’s application of
these cases and to clarify the rampant confusion that
has emerged in the lower courts in the wake of
Twombly and Iqbal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Amici curiae submit this brief in support of
the petition for a writ of certiorari because the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is a radical application of pleading
doctrine, reflecting broad confusion that has arisen
in the lower courts concerning the proper application
As explained in the accompanying motion, counsel of record for the parties received timely notice of amici curiae’s intent to file this brief as required by this Court’s Rule 37.2(a),
but counsel for Respondents did not provide written consent to
the filing of the brief. Petitioner had provided written consent
to the filing of this brief, a copy of which has been lodged with
the Clerk of Court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6,
amici state that no counsel for a party authored any part of this
brief, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. No person other than amici curiae, its members, its
counsel, or Outten & Golden LLP made a monetary contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission.
1
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of this Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. The
instant case involves Petitioner’s allegations that
Respondents failed to pay overtime wages required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See Pet. 34. Among other allegations, Petitioner alleged that
he regularly worked more than 40 hours per week,
but was not paid overtime on these occasions, and
that Respondents attempted to obscure this fact by
falsifying employment records. App. 51a-53a. The
Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner’s complaint must
be dismissed with prejudice2 because the complaint
did not allege that he had “worked more than forty
hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that
workweek,” App. 16a (emphasis added), and did not
“estimate the length of [his] average workweek during the applicable period and the average rate at
which [he] was paid, the amount of overtime wages
[he] believes [he] is owed, or any other facts that will
permit the court to find plausibility,” App. 17a. Contrary to this Court’s admonition in Iqbal and
Twombly, the Ninth Circuit applied a heightened
fact pleading standard to FLSA claims, and required
more from a FLSA plaintiff at the pleading stage
than might be required at trial, given the FLSA’s requirement that employers maintain accurate payroll
records.
Review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is important for several reasons.3 First, lower courts
Because the district court did not specify the nature of the
dismissal, it operates as a dismissal with prejudice. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b).
3 The petition and the decision below identify quite clearly
the conflict among the circuits that has arisen with respect to
2
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have openly expressed confusion regarding the application of Twombly and Iqbal, particularly with respect to policing the line between “factual” and “conclusory” allegations. This case presents an ideal opportunity to provide needed guidance to the lower
courts. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was erroneous, because it ignored the FLSA context in
which the instant case arose, and because it insisted
on an overly formalistic pleading requirement that
betrays this Court’s admonition in Iqbal and
Twombly that the Federal Rules do not require the
pleading of “specific” facts. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading
of specifics, . . . .”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87
(distinguishing between pleading under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 and the “particularity” required when pleading
matters encompassed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). The
Ninth Circuit’s decision makes pleading a technical
game and will take courts further from the merits
adjudication that was one of the principal goals of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). In sum,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision applies a heightened
pleading standard that finds no home in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8 or 12, or in this Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.

the proper pleading of FLSA claims. See Pet. 15-20; App. 13a16a. Amici therefore will not address that particular division
in the lower courts.
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I.

The Petition Should Be Granted Because
Lower Courts Are in Conflict Regarding
the Application of Pleading Standards
Following Twombly and Iqbal.

Iqbal and Twombly introduced a change in
federal pleading standards that had remained formally static for five decades, since this Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Under
Conley’s regime, complaints satisfied Rule 8(a)(2) so
long as they provided fair notice to the defendant of
the nature of suit, 355 U.S. at 47–48, and Rule
12(b)(6) was to be invoked in those rare cases in
which no viable legal theory supported a plaintiff’s
claim. Twombly, a complex antitrust case, introduced significant change. While Twombly did not
cast doubt on Conley’s fair notice standard – in fact,
it quoted that part of Conley with approval. 550 U.S.
at 555, and also endorsed Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), a decision that applied notice pleading to an employment discrimination complaint – the decision articulated a “plausibility” inquiry, 550 U.S. at 556–57, a term that was new to
Rule 12 adjudications. Two years later, Iqbal made
clear that Twombly’s approach applied in all civil
cases, not just to antitrust claims or cases in which
the costs of discovery were likely to be high and settlement-coercing. 556 U.S at 684.
Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. First,
courts must review each allegation in a complaint
and exclude from consideration those allegations
that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion. Id. at 68081. Second, courts must conduct a plausibility analysis that assesses the fit between the non-conclusory
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facts alleged in the complaint and the relief claimed.
Id. at 681. The judge may assess plausibility by calling on his or her “judicial experience and common
sense,” in some cases relying on assessments of the
existence of alternative lawful explanations for the
conduct alleged in the complaint. Id. at 679, 681-82.
Lower courts have experienced difficulty in
applying this federal pleading standard, in part because some courts perceive tension between Iqbal
and Twombly on the one hand, and prior decisions—
including ones that this Court has continued to cite
with approval—on the other. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247,
254 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Since Twombly and Iqbal,
Swierkiewicz's continued vitality has been an open
question in this Circuit.”); Horras v. American Capital Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798, 807 (8th Cir. 2013)
(“Iqbal says that Twombly applies to all civil actions,
but Swierkiewicz . . . , reaffirmed by Twombly, provides that the simplified notice pleading standard of
Rule 8(a) likewise applies to all civil actions.”);
Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to “unresolved tension” in pleading cases); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2101 (2012) (“To the extent that we perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups
of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should apply the more lenient or
the more demanding standard.”); In re Insurance
Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F.3d 300, 319
n.17 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement within
Third Circuit regarding how to interpret
Swierkiewicz in light of Iqbal); Swanson v. Citibank,
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N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts are
“still struggling” with how to apply federal pleading
standards after Twombly and Iqbal); Ruston v. Town
Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting that Iqbal had created tension with
prior Circuit cases involving pleading of equal protection claims). On its own, this confusion is sufficient ground to grant certiorari in this case, but as
both the Petition and the decision below explain,
there also is a deep and acknowledged split among
the courts of appeals with respect to how to apply
federal pleading standards in FLSA cases. See Pet.
15-20; App. 13a-16a.
Although this Court has addressed pleading
after Iqbal, it has not done so in a case that squarely
addresses the confusion lingering in the lower
courts. For instance, in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
521, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), the Court cited to
Swierkiewicz rather than Iqbal or Twombly when it
described the federal pleading standard. Id. at __,
131 S. Ct. at 1296 (“Because this case was resolved
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the question below was ‘not whether [Skinner] will
ultimately prevail’ on his procedural due process
claim, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974), but whether his complaint was sufficient to
cross the federal court's threshold.”). But Skinner
did not principally concern application of the federal
pleading standard; rather it raised the question
whether a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing could assert that
claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or was required to file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. It therefore did
not provide a full opportunity for the Court to clarify
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pleading standards. And this Term, the Court in
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014), reaffirmed Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163
(1993), a Conley-era pleading case that confirmed
that there is no heightened pleading requirement for
civil rights claims against municipalities. Johnson,
135 S. Ct. at 347 (citing Leatherman). But the critical issue in Johnson concerned whether a plaintiff
had to specifically identify the statute under which a
claim is brought in order to state a plausible claim.
Id. Johnson did not address in detail the factual sufficiency of the complaint at issue, other than to say
that it “stated simply, concisely, and directly events
that [plaintiffs] alleged entitled them to damages
from the city,” thereby accomplishing the purpose of
“inform[ing] the city of the factual basis for their
complaint.” Id. In contrast to Johnson and Skinner,
this case presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the confusion that has arisen in the lower courts as to when
a complaint’s allegations are factually sufficient.
The outcome in the Ninth Circuit rose and fell on the
question of the sufficiency of Petitioner’s factual allegations, not on the legal sufficiency of the pleadings that was central to both Skinner and Johnson.
Because of the confusion that persists in the
lower courts, amici curiae respectfully urge the
Court to grant the petition for writ of certiorari to
clarify the applicable pleading standard with respect
to factual sufficiency. Substantial risks stem from
ignoring these concerns and allowing lower courts to
continue to misinterpret Twombly and Iqbal. One
appeals court judge recently engaged in the “thought
experiment” of subjecting the allegations of injury
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made by the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to an “aggressive[]” plausibility analysis. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671
F.3d 611, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting in part). He began with the following critical
allegation from the plaintiffs’ complaint in Brown:
The educational opportunities provided
by defendants for infant plaintiffs in the
separate all-Negro schools are inferior
to those provided for white school children similarly situated in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. The respects in
which these opportunities are inferior
include the physical facilities, curricula,
teaching, resources, student personnel
services, access and all other educational factors, tangible and intangible,
offered to school children in Topeka.
Apart from all other factors, the racial
segregation herein practiced in and of
itself constitutes an inferiority in educational opportunity offered to Negroes,
when compared to educational opportunity offered to whites.
Amendment to Paragraph Eight of the
Amended Complaint, Brown v. Board of
Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951),
available
at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php
?id= 5479 (last visited March 10, 2015).
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As Judge Hamilton suggested, a strong argument could be made that the first and third sentences are bare legal conclusions that should be disregarded under Iqbal. 671 F.3d at 627. This leaves the
middle sentence, which contains some facts but—
under a misguided reading of Iqbal such as the
Ninth Circuit’s in the decision below—might be insufficient because there is no detail as to “how the
listed items are inferior.” Id. It should go without
saying that if there is uncertainty about whether a
case like Brown will be dismissed at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage before discovery and a merits determination, this Court should intervene to articulate
clearly the federal pleading standard. This case presents the Court with that opportunity.
II.

The Petition Should Be Granted Because
the Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Not Faithful to this Court’s Decision in Iqbal and
Twombly.

The petition for certiorari should also be
granted because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is in
conflict with both the letter and spirit of Iqbal and
Twombly. First, and most critically, in both decisions this Court disclaimed any intent to adopt a
pleading standard requiring the allegation of specific
facts. In Twombly, for instance, responding to the
concern that its approach is in conflict with
Swierkiewicz, this Court stated that “we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. And in
Iqbal, the Court was concerned about a plaintiff
pleading “the bare elements of his cause of action”
and nothing more. 556 U.S. at 687. Second, this
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Court emphasized in Iqbal that the plausibility inquiry is context-specific, and must take into account
the underlying substantive law. Id. at 679. Finally,
courts must bear in mind that a complaint is not
meant to prove a claim; it simply must allege facts
that—when accepted as true—“raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” satisfying the elements of the legal claim. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556; see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) (quoting
Twombly).
With this guidance in mind, the errors of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion are clear. First, the court below faulted Petitioner’s complaint for failing to identify the “given” week in which overtime violations
occurred, App. 16a,4 and did not “estimate the length
of [his] average workweek during the applicable period and the average rate at which [he] was paid, the
amount of overtime wages [he] believes [he] is owed,
The panel opinion originally found the complaint insufficient because it did not identify the “specific” week in which
overtime violations occurred. App. 38a, 40a. The panel then
sua sponte issued a new opinion, replacing the word “specific”
with “given.” App. 3a-4a. That the Ninth Circuit considered
this change significant is indicative of the panel’s hypertechnical application of Iqbal and Twombly. The dictionary
definition of “given,” when used as an adjective as it is in the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, is “specified.” See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 539 (11th ed. 2003). Although one
hesitates to ascribe a motive to an unexplained sua sponte
modification of the decision below, one conceivable explanation
is that the panel was conscious that this Court had disclaimed
any intent in requiring the pleading of “specific” facts. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. But engaging in wordplay by replacing “specific” with “given” does not resolve the tension between the decision below and this Court’s precedent.
4
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or any other facts that will permit the court to find
plausibility,” App. 17a. The lower court did not explain how the addition of these facts would enable it
to better evaluate the plausibility of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Certainly, Form 11’s negligence complaint, held up as an example of sufficient pleading
in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10, provides no detail
as to how the defendant was driving, how damages
were calculated, or any number of other facts that
might be relevant to a liability and damages assessment. See Form 11, Complaint for Negligence,
Forms App., Fed. R. Civ. P. Nor did the complaint
found sufficient by this Court in Johnson. See Complaint, Johnson v. City of Shelby, No. 10 Civ. 36
(N.D. Miss. March 10, 2010). The Ninth Circuit’s
approach to plausibility insisted on evidence of liability and appears to be premised on the assumption
that a plaintiff must allege all facts that he might
reasonably have access to, when that is not the role
of the pleading. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (a complaint must allege facts that “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” satisfying the elements of the legal claim); Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 511 (“[I]t is not appropriate to require a
plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie
case.”)
Moreover, in the context of an FLSA case, requiring plaintiffs to identify the specific week in
which they were not paid overtime, the amount they
are owed, or similar details, runs afoul of the remedial purpose of the statute and is precisely the kind
of gamesmanship that the Rules were meant to do
away with. If this case were to proceed to trial, and
were Petitioner to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the
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Respondents’ records, Petitioner would satisfy his
burden of proof by introducing enough evidence to
support a reasonable inference of hours worked. See
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,
687 (1946) (when an employer fails to keep accurate
time records reflecting hours of work, a plaintiff may
“show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference”). As many
courts have held, this burden can be satisfied by an
FLSA plaintiff’s estimate of hours worked, whether
adduced through testimony or other record evidence.
See Monterossa v. Martinez Rest. Corp., No. 11 CIV.
3689 JMF, 2012 WL 3890212, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 2012); Rodriguez v. Almighty Cleaning, Inc., 784
F. Supp. 2d 114, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2010).
The burden would then shift to the Respondents to
come forward with evidence to negate “the inference
to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.” Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88. The reason for this burdenshifting scheme is that, although an FLSA plaintiff
bears the burden of proving “that he performed work
for which he was not properly compensated,” the
“remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public
policy which it embodies . . . militate against making that burden an impossible hurdle for the employee.” Id. at 687.
The Ninth Circuit’s rule would impose an extremely difficult hurdle for FLSA plaintiffs to overcome at the pleading stage, when a plaintiff’s burden
should be lower than the one he would bear at the
proof stage. FLSA claims may be instituted up to
three years after an alleged violation, 29 U.S.C. §
255(a). The Ninth Circuit’s decision puts the onus
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on a plaintiff, several years removed from the
violation in question, to identify the specific week in
which overtime was not paid. Moreover, such a rule
serves to undermine Rule 8(a)’s purpose, which as
this Court held this Term requires only that
plaintiffs “state[] simply, concisely, and directly
events that [plaintiffs] allege[] entitle[] them to
damages.”
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347.
The
information required by the Ninth Circuit does not
provide any additional relevant notice to the
defendant of the factual basis for the plaintiff’s
claim. Moreover, defendants have at least as much
access, if not more, to precisely this evidence. And
as discussed above, if the defendants do not have
adequate employment records, the FLSA establishes
a presumption in favor of the correctness of the
plaintiff’s evidence as to underpayment.
See
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687. In short, the Ninth
Circuit’s holding provides a technical ground for
securing a dismissal and shielding a defendant from
liability that might easily be imposed were the case
to proceed to discovery and trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the
Court to grant the petition for certiorari and vacate
the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
Respectfully submitted,
ALEXANDER A. REINERT
Counsel of Record
55 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003
(212) 790-0403
areinert@yu.edu
Attorney for Amici Curiae
MARCH 2015
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